Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 2

December 1932

Is Mortgagor's Liability Extinguished by Extension of Time for
Payment without His Consent
Gale Blocki

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gale Blocki, Is Mortgagor's Liability Extinguished by Extension of Time for Payment without His Consent,
11 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1 (1932).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol11/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

CHICAGO. KENT
REVIEW
VOL. XI

DECEMBER,

1932

No. 1

IS MORTGAGOR'S LIABILITY EXTINGUISHED
BY EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PAYMENT
WITHOUT HIS CONSENT?
GALE BLOCKI'

N

O mortgagor is pleased to have a deficiency decree
against him after he has parted with his land under
the belief that his grantee will pay the mortgage. Many
courts have found a way to relieve the mortgagor of embarrassment where the grantee had, at the time of the
conveyance, before maturity of the debt, expressly assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage and where the
mortgagee had subsequently extended the time of payment without the consent or knowledge of the original
mortgagor.
If the mortgage note is a negotiable instrument, the
personal liability of the mortgagor cannot, consistently
with the statutes on negotiable instruments, be extinguished by extension of time for payment. The Illinois
Supreme and Appellate Courts, for many years, have
permitted this question to turn upon a determination of
whether the mortgagor 's grantee (i. e. the one to whom he
sold the property subject to the mortgage) assumed and
agreed to pay the mortgage debt. If he did and thereafter extended the time for payment of the note without
the consent of his grantor (the mortgagor), the liability
of such grantor was extinguished; if the grantee did not
assume and agree to pay the mortgage debt and extended
1 Member of Illinois Bar.
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the time for payment thereof without the consent of his
grantor, the liability of such grantor, as mortgagor, was
not extinguished.
The theory of law assumed by the court in these decisions was that where A, the owner of a piece of property which had been encumbered by him, conveyed the
same to B, the relationship as between A and B became
that of principal and surety, B being the principal debtor
and A the surety; that the principles of suretyship apply,
and if X, the owner of the mortgage note, extended the
time of payment thereof without the consent of A, then
A was discharged from liability upon the note.
An examination of Illinois cases upon this question discloses that there was, in all cases, evidence that the purchaser had assumed and agreed to pay the encumbrance
and it was, therefore, held that the mortgagor 's liability
was extinguished by the 2extension of the time for payment without his consent.
On the other hand, where a purchaser had not assumed
or agreed to pay an encumbrance, no relationship of principal and surety existed, the theory of law above set forth
did not apply, and an extension, without the mortgagor 's
consent, did not release him from liability. An interesting case supporting this last statement is Sholten v. Barber.$ Sholten executed her promissory note to Cooper
for five thousand dollars, payable five years after its
date, secured by trust deed upon certain real estate.
Sholten thereafter conveyed the property to Dexter, who
assumed the payment of the encumbrance. There were
several subsequent conveyances of the property by quitclaim deeds, containing no assumption of the mortgage
debt, ending with a deed of that character from Martin
to Millam. The note later became the property of Barber. Upon the maturity of the note, the interest was reduced from 8 per cent to 6 per cent and the time of payment extended for three years by endorsement on the
2 Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Narvid, 259 Ill. App. 555; Douglass v.
Ullsperger, 251 Il. App. 145.
3 217 Il. 148.
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note. Millam, the then owner of the real estate, executed
interest notes for the extended period. Thereafter the
trust deed was foreclosed and the proceeds of the foreclosure sale endorsed on the principal note, leaving a
balance due, for which suit was brought against Sholten,
the maker of the note. Judgment was entered in the
lower court for the plaintiff and, on appeal, it was argued
against the ruling of the court that Millam, by the extension agreement, became the principal debtor to the
plaintiff and that the defendant, the maker of the note,
became surety for Millam; that the plaintiff extended the
time of payment to Millam, as principal debtor, without
the knowledge or consent of the defendant and that defendant, being a mere surety, was released from all liability. In sustaining the holding of the lower court, the
Supreme Court, after reviewing the authorities relating
to a situation where the purchaser of the property has
assumed and agreed to pay the encumbrance, says:.
The mere purchase of land does not render the purchaser liable
for an encumbrance upon it, and an obligation on his part to
pay it can only arise from his contract, either express or implied by law from the circumstances .... There was no agree-

ment by Millam to pay the amount of the encumbrance when
the endorsement was made on the note or at any other time.
Whatever legal effect could be given to the endorsement signed
by Donovan Real Estate Company or to the interest notes
executed by the same company, as agent, there was no agreement on the part of Millam to pay the principal note. Plaintiff could not have maintained an action against Millam for
the amount of such note, and as he never assumed or agreed
to pay it, the defendant never became, and could not become,
his surety.
The court refused to admit in evidence a copy of one of the
quit-claim deeds in the chain of conveyances to Millam for
want of sufficient evidence upon which to introduce such copy.
The question whether the ruling was correct is immaterial.
The promise of Dexter [the original grantee] to pay the en-

cumbrance was not a covenant running with the land, and if
the deed had been admitted so as to show the legal title given
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to Millam, the rights of the parties would not have been affected in any way. There was no evidence tending to prove a
defense to the note, and the court was right in directing a
verdict for the amount due on the note.
In the year 1928 in the State of Nebraska, in the case of
Peter v. Finzer,4 the Supreme Court of Nebraska held
that since the adoption of the Nebraska Negotiable Instruments Act the liability of the maker of a note could
only be extinguished by one of the methods prescribed in
the Act, and that extending the time for payment of a
mortgage note by agreement of the then owner of the
property with the holder of the note, whether the owner
of the property had assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage note or not, was not included in the Act as one of
the methods by which this liability could be extinguished.
In that case it was urged upon the court, by the maker of
the note, that his liability had been extinguished by an
extension of time for payment by the subsequent owner
of the property, who had assumed and agreed to pay the
note, and the court said:
On the basis of the facts set forth in his answer, the defendant in the court below, as a matter of law, contended that

where one buys land encumbered by a mortgage debt and, as
a part of the consideration of the purchase, assumes the payment thereof, his promise creates a principal obligation which
the mortgagee may enforce against him; that the maker of
the note and mortgage thereafter, between the parties, sustains the relation of surety only; that a subsequent agreement
by the mortgagee and payee with such subsequent grantee,
without the assent of the grantor and mortgagor, extending
time of payment of the debt, evidenced by the note and mortgage which has been assumed by such grantee, discharges the
maker and mortgagor from all personal liability thereon. This
conclusion seems fully supported by the doctrine announced by
5
this court in Merriam v. Miles.
The controlling question now is, to what extent, if any, has
the doctrine thus announced been modified or affected by the
116 Neb. 380.
5 54 Neb. 566, decided in 1898.
4

EXTINGUISHMENT OF MORTGAGOR'S LIABILITY

provisions of the Nebraska Negotiable Instruments Act adopted, effective August 1, 1905? . . .
This court is committed to the doctrine that, so far as applicable, the provisions of our Negotiable Instruments Act
determine the mutual rights of the immediate parties to the
instrument as between themselves.
Finzer, at its inception, was the sole maker of the instrument in suit.
"The maker of a negotiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay it according to its tenor, and admits the
existence of the payee and his then capacity to endorse," [citing Negotiable Instruments Act).
Section 4801, Comp. St. 1922, provides: "The person 'primarily' liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms
of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All
other parties are 'secondarily' liable."
It would seem incontestable that Finzer, by the terms of
the instrument in suit, being absolutely required to pay the
same, is "primarily" liable thereon. The language of Section
4801, supra, affirmatively excludes him from the classification of "secondarily" liable.
Article 8 of our Negotiable Instruments Law covers the
subject of discharge of negotiable instruments. The first section thereof provides: "A negotiable instrument is discharged:
First. By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor. Second. By payment in due course by the party
accommodated where the instrument is made or accepted for
accommodation. Third. By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder. Fourth. By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money. Fifth.
When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right."
Applicable to those exclusively who are "secondarily" liable on negotiable instruments, the second section of Article 8
provides: "A person secondarily liable on the instrument is
discharged: First. By any act which discharged the instrument. Second. By the intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder. Third. By the discharge of a prior party.
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Fourth. By a valid tender of payment made by a prior party.
Fifth. By a release of the principal debtor, unless the holder's right of recourse against the party secondarily liable is
expressly reserved. Sixth. By any agreement binding upon
the holder to extend the time of payment, or to postpone the
holder's right to enforce the instrument, unless made with the
assent of the person secondarily liable, or unless the right of
recourse against such party is expressly reserved."
It may also be said that the statute under consideration
makes no provision for the proof of another and different relation than that expressly undertaken and defined by the tenor
of the instrument signed. This Act further provides in definite
terms that the instrument, and hence one primarily liable, is
discharged in one of the five ways set forth in Section 4729,...
above quoted. There is no mention in this Section of a discharge of a person "primarily" liable by an extension of time.
But, among the ways in which a party "secondarily" liable
may be discharged as above set forth, in Section 4730, supra,
is "any agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time
of payment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the
instrument, unless made with the assent of the person secondarily liable," etc. Whatever interpretation might be required
of Section 4729, supra, containing an enumeration of the ways
in which the instrument, and consequently the parties primarily
liable thereon, might be discharged, if this provision stood
alone, the inference arising from the omission of extension of
time from such enumeration, and its inclusion among the ways
in which parties "secondarily" liable may be discharged as
above set forth in Section 4730, supra, necessitates and renders
irresistible the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend
that persons primarily liable should be discharged in that manner. Or, in other words, parties to a negotiable instrument,
primarily liable thereon, may be discharged only in the manner
provided by statute.
The conclusion follows that the extension of time set forth
in defendant's answer did not constitute a valid defense to
the action upon the note in suit, in view of the fact that the
defendant was, under the terms of the statute, primarily liable
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thereon. . . . This conclusion is, in principle, in full accord
with the great weight of authority in other states ...

The identical question arose in the State of Washington in ContinentalMutual Savings Bank v. Elliott,6 where
it was likewise held that the maker of the note was not
discharged from liability by virtue of the extension of
time entered into between a subsequent grantee and the
mortgagee, although the grantee had assumed and agreed
to pay the mortgage encumbrance.
The same conclusion has been reached by courts of the
following states: Arizona, Colorado," Indiana, 9 Kansas, 10
Kentucky," Maryland, 2 Massachusetts,
Minnesota, 4
15
6
17
8
9
New York, Ohio,' Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee,"
20 and Utah.2 1 Iowa alone stands contrary. 22
Texas,
Of course, it is fundamental that the court of no state in
which the law is enacted is bound by the construction of the
statute by the courts of other states; but courts, with full
knowledge of the history of this legislation, and knowing that
its chief purpose is as stated above, should, we think, upon all
questions of construction, where the rule adopted by other
states is not plainly erroneous, be disposed to follow the con6 166 Wash. 283.
7 Cowan v. Ramsey, 15 Ariz. 533.
SHall v. Farmers' Bank, 74 Colo. 165.
9 Fox v. Terre Haute National Bank, 78 Ind. App. 666.
10 Niotaze State Bank v. Cooper, 99 Kan. 731.
11 First State Bank v. Williams, 164 Ky. 143.
12Vanderford v. Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank, 105 Md.
164.
13 Union Trust Company v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205.
14 Vernon Center State Bank v. Mangelsen, 166 Minn. 472.
15National Citizens' Bank v. Toplitz, 81 N. Y. S. 422 (affirmed on
other grounds in 178 N. Y. 464).
16 Richards v. Market Exchange Bank Company, 81 Ohio St. 348.
17 Cleveland National Bank v. Bickel, 59 Okla. 279.
18 Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Or. 186.
19 Graham v. Shephard, 136 Tenn. 418.
20 Clem v. Chapman, (Tex. Civ. App.) 262 S. W. 168, (affirmed in 114
Tex. 582).
21 Wolstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah 300.
22 Fullerton Lumber Company v. Snouffer, 139 Iowa 176.
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struction given to the act by the courts of the state in which
the act has heretofore been adopted and construed; and particularly should this be true where the statute involves a question
upon which the authorities, independent of a statute, are so
greatly divided as they are upon the question presented in the
case at bar, for by no other course may uniformity be obtained.
' 23

The Illinois Negotiable Instruments Act is substantially the same as those of Nebraska and the states before
named. In the latter jurisdictions, where prior to the
enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Act the courts
held that, in cases where the grantee had assumed and
agreed to pay the mortgage, a subsequent extension of
time to him by the holder of the mortgage released the
maker of the note, the same courts now hold that such
rule of law is, since the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Act, no longer applicable. But the point seems
never to have been raised in Illinois. There are undoubtedly other states whose Negotiable Instruments
Acts would alter the decisions of the courts if the point
were once raised.
Quite recently the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, in the case of Fleming v. Gannon,24 held that the Ne-

gotiable Instruments Act specifies how a person primarily liable or secondarily liable may be discharged and
holds that subordinating a lien without the knowledge
and consent of the defendants (who were the makers of
the note) was not among them. The judgment rendered
by the Municipal Court was reversed and the case remanded. It is regrettable that the Appellate Court
could not have made a finding of facts and entered judgment, that the cause might have gone to the Supreme
Court. It was not necessary, in the decision, that the
court find whether the defendants were primarily or secondarily liable but the court, in its opinion, stated that
even conceding that defendants were secondarily liable,
their liability was not discharged under the Negotiable
23 Cherokee National Bank v. Union Trust

24 267 111. App. 163.

Company, 33 Okla. 342.
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Instruments Act, which Act specifies in detail how persons primarily and secondarily liable might be discharged. It is unfortunate that the court, in its opinion,
did not find that defendants were primarily liable under
the Act and that the subordinating of the lien, without
their consent, was not among the ways specified in the
Act for discharging persons primarily liable. The Gannons were the makers of the note and the Illinois Negotiable Instruments Act25 particularly sets forth that "The
person 'primarily' liable on an instrument is the person
who, by the terms of the instrument, is absolutely required to pay 2 the
same. All other parties are 'secon6
darily' liable."
Under the Negotiable Instruments Act the maker of
a promissory note, secured by a mortgage upon real estate, is primarily liable and his liability can only be discharged in the ways set forth in the Act relating to a person primarily liable. Even though he may thereafter
sell the property to one who agrees to assume and pay
the mortgage indebtedness, he is, by the tenor of the instrument, the one primarily liable under the Act, and this
liability can only be extinguished in the manner provided for in the Act.27 Under former decisions, if his
25 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1931), Ch. 98. par. 214.

26 In Sehrader v. Heflebower, 243 Ill. App. 139, the defendant signed
as surety and the plaintiff knew this, and had not the defendant waived
the provisions of the statute, he would have been discharged by an extension of time under Art. 8, see. 119, par. 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1931), Ch. 98, par. 141.
The court
apparently assumed that a surety is secondarily liable. But a surety is
by common law primarily liable and he certainly comes within the defi-

nition of persons primarily liable in the statute.
27 Cahill's Ill.Rev. St. (1931), Ch. 98, par. 140.

It is worth noting

that the Illinois Act omits one provision of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, i. e. ''by any other act which will discharge a simple
s
contract for the payment of money."
Nevertheless it was held in Gorin

v. Wiley, 215 Ill. App. 541, that parties primarily liable on a negotiable
instrument were discharged by any act which would discharge a simple
contract for the payment of money, and the maker was held to be re-

leased by a novation.

This view was based on the provision "In

any

case not provided for in this act, the rules of the law merchant shall
govern," Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1931), Ch. 98, par. 218. But this provision was certainly not intended to cover a method of discharge im-

pliedly excluded by the Act-''Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."
Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Or. 186; Vanderford v. Farmers' and Mechanics'
National Bank, 105 Md. 164.

10
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grantee, who assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage,
extended the time for payment, such grantee would have
become the principal debtor and the original mortgagor
would have become the surety. In none of the cases so
holding, however, subsequent to the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law, has the decision either referred to the law or discussed its provisions. The statute
has changed the common law with respect to this subject,
and the maker of a note, who is primarily liable, can only
be discharged by one of the methods provided for in the
Act.

